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Abstract : Across industrialised and developing countries public pension systems have been heavily reformed during 
the last two decades. To solve public pension system crisis many proposals were issued to privatize social security 
(completely or partially) shifting towards scaling down the current pay-as-you-go system. We estimate the impact on 
national saving of an increase in mandatory private pension funding for Australia and Iceland. The aim is twofold: 1) to 
examine the pension systems of these two countries in a more general perspective with the purpose to analyse how their 
retirement income provisions have evolved into a multi-pillar arrangement and their impact on national saving; 2)  to 
ask if there are important lessons for others in pension experiences of Australia and Iceland. The validity of the effect of 
pension reforms on domestic savings are studied in two steps: first, using an ARDL model of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001); second, employing the Kalman filter algorithm, in order to recover the parameter dynamics overtime. The 
empirical evidence derived from the ARDL approach does support the widely held view that growing mandatory 
pension funds financial assets has significantly positive impact on national saving. Moreover, we show that the pattern 
of the pension funds’ coefficients seemed to capture well the economic dynamic of the period.  
The results exhibit that the social security reform that take the form of three-pillar system is, in particular, beneficial for 
small open economies and, despite the aging structure and the different degree of smoothness, the implementation of 
multipillar system in both cases leads to a general raise in national saving. Hence, a mandatory retirement saving policy 
could improve the financial sustainability of social security systems and, through the positive impact on national saving, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Within the past two decades many countries around the globe have implemented intense pension 
reform, which have often involved an increased use of  funded pension programmes managed by 
the private sector. 
Most of the world’s countries are characterized by public pension provision financed by tax 
contributions on a pay-as-you-go basis, even if there could be important differences in size and 
degree of targeting (universal and/or means-tested). The pay-as-you-go social security system was 
planned to offer almost complete coverage to old-age needs and was designed under the influence 
of high economic growth in the ‘50s and ‘60s, without any consideration about long-term dynamics. 
Currently, the western countries are facing lower growth rates while declining fertility rates and 
lower mortality rates are leading to an increase in the dependency ratio. As a consequence, the most 
unfunded systems are faced with financial sustainability problems. Many countries have enacted 
reforms which cut benefits and increase contributions and consequently most reformed pension 
systems are increasingly based on the rejection of the dominance of the public pension pillar. 
Hence, the aim is to move to a multipillar
1 system with a greater role given to the private sector, so 
that it can provide a minimum floor income for the elderly. 
There are several reasons to increase funding within public or private pension systems. Among 
others
2, the one that is strictly related to the object of this paper is that such a policy could produce 
an equivalent increase in national saving, reducing the burden placed on the future workers who 
must support the retired elderly. Since Feldstein’s seminal work (1974), this topic has been on the 
research agenda in the USA for over two decades. Higher saving and faster capital formation can 
boost the future national income. Advance funding would thus provide a means by which current 
workers could provide additional resources for their own retirement, reducing the burden on the 
consumption of future workers. A heated debate has developed over the merits of a social security 
reform based on the building of a multipillar system and, in particular, over its impact on saving. 
Despite the fact that research methods and the underlying models have changed as well as the 
quality and detail of macro-economic statistics have improved, there is no full agreement about the 
                                                 
1 Each pension pillar provides the three functions in different ways. The first pillar, public pay-as-you-go, usually 
defined-benefit and redistributive, should provide social safety net support to everyone. The second one is a privately 
managed funded pillar that handles peoples’ mandatory retirement savings; unlike the public pillar – which is 
redistributive, centrally controlled, and tax-financed - the second mandatory pillar should highlight savings. Finally, the 
third pillar encourages discretionary retirement savings and capital development. 
2 Another justification for proposals to shift from pay go to private pension schemes is  that such a policy will remedy to 
labour market distortions (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995; Feldstein, 1996; Feldstein and Samwick, 1997; Kotlikoff, 
1996a and 1996b). However, the aim of this paperis is not to analyse the relationship between funded pension schemes 
and labour market.       3
answer. This paper intend to investigate whether this explanation for advanced funding is valid. In 
doing so we try to estimate the impact on national saving of an increase in mandatory private 
pension funding for two countries that are increasingly meeting the criteria of the prototype three 
pillar system as suggested by the World Bank (1994): Australia and Iceland. Their social security 
systems could be a typical example of a great role given to the second mandatory private pension 
pillar since they exhibit the largest pension funds in relation to the size of their respective 
economies. 
Hence, the approach taken in this study is that of long-run equilibrium via cointegration. Instead of 
relying on the more common Johansen multivariate cointegration procedure, autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration modelling of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) will be carried 
out to determine if there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between national savings and 
pension funds in Australia and Iceland economies. In this regard, we test the hypothesis that the 
contemporaneous convergence of the variables in the system exhibits minimum systematic error 
due to the presence of an error correction mechanism (short-term relationship). 
Moreover, this study implements an additional analysis based on the Kalman filter methodology in 
order to analyse the paths of the pension funds with respect to national savings. The time varying-
parameter technique uses the basic idea that the parameter vector in an econometric relationship 
may be subjected to sequential variation over time because of the problems of structural change, 
misspecification and aggregation.  
The results of this study reveal that there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between national 
savings and pension funds. Additionally, the combined impact of private pension provision and life 
insurance on national savings is positive both for Australia and Iceland. Moreover, further evidence 
came from the Kalman filter methodology where the behaviour of the coefficients of pension funds’ 
variable show a positive trend. 
The innovative feature of our study is that, analysing Australia and Iceland, we consider two typical 
examples of multipillar system characterized by a small public pension pillar, a large mandatory 
private pension pillar and a considerable voluntary pension saving. In order to be efficient a pension 
system should take into account lifetime risks facing individuals and society as a whole. 
Furthermore a certain degree of income equalisation should be built into the system. Then the 
pension system should have at least some degree of flexibility and scope for choice for the 
individuals. Finally, it should be designed in such a way as to promote economic performance, that 
is, saving, growth and financial sector development
3.  
                                                 
3 To meet these demands at least in part, a good pension system should be based on three pillars. Firstly, a tax-financed 
public plan that provides a flat-rate or means-tested basic pension. Secondly, a mandatory occupational or private, but 
publicly regulated, funded pension scheme. Thirdly, a voluntary pension saving scheme, often with tax incentives.   4
Our findings indicate that increases in pension funds financial assets increase national saving when 
pension funds are the result of a mandatory pension program. An interesting feature of the results 
about Australian and Icelandic pension system, which are compatible with results from other 
developed countries, is that the shift to a multipillar system implemented by these countries could 
give useful suggestions to policy makers that are facing problems with social security reforms. 
Moreover, a novelty of this work is that the contribution rate to pension funds, increasing national 
saving as found in Australia and Iceland, could be an important policy instrument whose effect can 
be twofold: 1)  to secure a minimum replacement rate at retirement; 2) to raise the future national 
income through a faster capital formation. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section III reviews the evolution of pension system focusing, in particular, on Australia 
and Iceland. The data, the ARDL cointegration methodology, the Kalman filter and the empirical 
results are explained in Section IV. Policy implications and the main conclusions will be 
summarised in the fifth section. 
 
2.  A Brief Literature Review 
 
The impact of the pension system on individual saving has been a concern since Feldstein’s (1974) 
pioneering paper, which centres around the funding status of social security and, in particular, on 
the degree to which an unfunded pension system reduces private saving. The latter is the central 
question of the current debate
4. However, the question analysed in this study is the impact on 
national saving of the implementation of a multipillar system, consisting of public pay-as-you-go 
scheme and of compulsory saving in funded pension plans, as in the Australian and Icelandic 
pension system.  
According to Feldstein (1996) one of the benefits claimed for the private funded pension schemes is 
that they rise national saving. The reduction of the size of public unfunded scheme could rise saving 
and wealth directly by reducing government debt and indirectly increasing saving through two other 
paths. On one side, the elimination of payroll tax may lead to an increase in labour supply thus 
boosting GDP and increase saving. On the other side, the shift to funded pension scheme may 
stimulate the capital market, leading to an increase in the efficiency of investment (higher rate of 
return), and thereby to an increase in economic growth and saving, depending on the extent of 
capital market development prior the reform
5. While theoretical arguments tend to be consistent 
                                                 
4 This literature is reviewed and summarized in CBO (1998) and Atkinson (1987). 
5 Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) explore - in a deliberately provocative manner - the multipillars system of the “World Bank 
model” with a particular attention to the private mandatory defined contribution component. They debunk ten myths to   5
with the view that higher private savings are associated with funding than with PAYG, convincing 
empirical support is missing. 
  Several studies have analysed transition from unfunded to fully funded system in overlapping 
generation  framework (Arrau and Scmidt-Hebbel, 1999; Cifuentes and Valdes Prieto, 1997, and 
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 1998). The most significant burden due to this shift has to be 
supported by the transitional generations since they have to pay double contributions, their own and 
that of current retirement individuals under the unfounded system. 
As Samwick (2000) remarks, the intergenerational allocation of the transition cost is the most 
important consideration to determine the effect of the regime change on saving. 
How the government manages this additional financing requirement is crucial to the effect of the 
transition on saving, as discussed in Holzmann (1997). If the government tries to finance the 
implicit pension debts by issuing explicit debt, then public savings would decrease, so the overall 
national saving rate might be unchanged or even fall, expect for small changes that may arise out of 
a new distribution of the burden of financing the explicit versus implicit debt (Cesaratto 2006). For 
example, a simulation study by Hviding and Merette (1998) gives evidence that debt financed 
transitions may not have considerable effects on national saving and output; all that may happen is 
that the government has altered the form of the debt. 
Another possibility is to finance the transition increasing taxation. As a consequence, the disposable 
income of current workers will decline and if their consume will fall by the same amount, the 
national saving will raise by an equal amount of tax increase. According to the life-cycle model,  
individuals will try to smooth the tax raise over their entire life time. So part of  tax income will be 
financed by a lower private saving (Samwick, 2000). 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Kotlikoff (1996a), Mitchell and Zeldes (1996) underline that if 
individuals are completely rational life-cycle savers, the introduction of a  mandatory saving 
program would not have any net effect on national saving because rational individuals will reduce 
their previous saving by an equal amount. An investment based program should raise aggregate 
saving only if individuals are myopic or do not save for other reasons (for instance, bequest) . 
The introduction of mandatory saving in funded pension schemes – as the case of Australia and 
Iceland private pension programs - could induce individuals at first  to reduce other types of saving 
to offset compulsory saving.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
stress that the general opinions most frequently used to support investment-based programs are often not confirmed in 
theory and practice. Among them, the first myth is about the common idea that private defined contribution plans raise 
national saving. 
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The aim of the transition plan must be to assure the same level of benefits as the existing PAYG 
with a lower contribution rate to the new mandatory saving plan. In this case, if “the retirement 
income provided by the Social Security program is unchanged” as Feldstein has put it, “savers 
would have no reason to reduce their direct discretionary personal saving in response to a 
mandatory saving program”(2001, pp.58-9). This is a very important remark. Indeed, a double 
charge on current workers might leave the saving supply untouched if workers cut their private 
saving after being obliged to save more through Social Security. It is less plausible for them to do 
so if, in spite of the double charge, they are promised the same pension as before. Musgrave(1981, 
p.124) argued that if “additional contributions do not bring a promise of additional benefits, there is 
no good reason to expect a substitution of private saving”. 
By substituting a smaller amount of compulsory saving for a large public unfunded pension tax,  
households will have more disposable income that will be used to finance present consumption and 
future consumption increasing current saving. However this should be true only after the reform has 
been implemented. At the beginning, the households would suffer a double charge so their 
disposable income could be diminished. Later, the higher returns (supposedly) due to the new 
investment-based compulsory scheme could allow a reduction of the total contribution rate to obtain 
the same pension, eventually, even below that initially paid to the PAYG scheme. 
Two well known cross sectional studies by Cagan (1965) and Katona (1965) have shown that 
employees covered by private pensions do not save less and may even save more than employees 
not covered by private pensions. Cagan’s interpretation of these results is that the degree of pension 
coverage may be considered as a measure of the importance of saving for retirement and therefore 
saving could increase due to this recognition effect. The explanation of Katona is different and is 
based on the idea that the effort employed to achieve a goal increases when the distance to the goal 
decreases. In this case the goal would be an adequate retirement consumption.  
Different findings were obtained by Munnel (1976). He used a sample of 5,000 men with ages 
included between 45 and 59 in 1966. The author presented evidence showing that the saving of 
employees covered by private pensions is largely less than the saving of  employees not covered by 
private pensions. From a cross-country empirical evidence, Baillu and Reisen (1997) study the 
effect of funded pension wealth as a determinant of private saving working with a sample of 10 
countries and a panel of more than 100 observations. The authors show that funded pension wealth 
increases private saving rates in developing countries with mandatory funded pension programs. 
More recently, Murphy and Musalem (2004) conduct an empirical study on the effect of the 
accumulation of pension fund financial assets on national saving, using a panel of 43 industrial and 
developing countries. The authors divide the countries into two groups: the first one includes   7
countries whose data on pension asset are mainly due to compulsory funded pension program; the 
second group of countries is instead characterized by data that are the result of voluntary funded 
pension program. The latter includes Australia for witch the authors obtained pension assets time 
series as the sum of both compulsory and voluntary pension program. They focus on pension funds 
financial assets and their impact on national saving rate. Their findings suggest that increases in 
pension funds financial assets increase national saving when pension funds are the result of a 
mandatory pension program.  
Despite the goals underlined by Murphy and Musalem (2004), we are interested into studying the 
effect of the reforms implemented by Australia and Iceland on national saving. The aim of the 
present paper is to verify if, reforms consisting in a shift from a pay-as-you-go to a multipillar 
system with a greater role give to the second pillar (mandatory pension funds), foster national 
saving.   
Coates (2004) proposes an heterodox argument showing that in Australia “…compulsory 
superannuation has not increased national savings and is unlikely to do so into the future…”. These 
conclusions are based on the link between national saving and the globalisation effects. He argues 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the national savings components due to the 
inflow and outflow of capitals.  
As previously emphasized, several countries have mandatory pension schemes like Australia, 
Iceland, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In this paper we focus our analysis to two prototypical 
examples of mandating of private pensions, Australia and Iceland to study the effect of funded 
pension programs on retirement saving and national saving.  
 
 
3.  Australian and Icelandic Pension System 
 
The largest pension funds in relation to the size of their respective economies are the ones that have 
had mandatory or quasi mandatory pension funds for many years, like Australia, Iceland, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland
6. An additional country with a long history in mandatory funded 
pensions is Denmark, but the sector is dominated by pension entities established as insurance 
undertakings. Finland has also had mandatory occupational pension arrangements for a limited time 
but the schemes (which are part of social security) are only partly funded. The largest voluntary 
pension fund systems are those in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada (OECD, 2005). 
                                                 
6 In Iceland and Australia, however, the participation in pension funds, which should be left to individual choice, is 
instead mandatory in agreements between unions and employers; that private pensions receive not only the effective 
regulation and supervision of financial markets but also of a public guarantee reintroducing elements of PAYG 
financing (Castellino and Fornero, 2007).   8
In this paper we focus our analysis on Australia and Iceland that are increasingly meeting the 
criteria of the prototype three pillar system. These countries are interesting to study the effect of 
funded pension programs on retirement saving and national saving. 
 
Australian Pension System 
The Australian retirement system was reformed in 1993 following the key pension system reforms 
that most of the industrialized countries are now struggling with. Australia provides a three-pillar 
system which combines the Age Pension, a flat-rate means-tested first pillar pension financed by 
general revenues
7, with the second pillar, Superannuation Guarantee Contribution (henceforth SGC) 
which requires employers to contribute on behalf of their employees to privately managed funds
8.  
The first pillar,  Age Pension,  provides benefits that guarantee a minimum standard of living. It is 
payable to women aged 60 years and over, and to men aged 65 years and over until July 1995. 
Eligibility is governed also by residency criteria. The pension is means tested in accordance with 
either a person’s income or, since March 1985, a person’s assets, whichever determines the lower 
rate of pension. Twice yearly the value of the pension is indexed automatically against the effects of 
inflation in accordance with movements in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Crucially, the Age Pension has never been linked to an individual’s earning history as it is typical in 
other OECD countries. As a consequence, the introduction of mandatory private retirement saving 
does not entail transition problems of the kinds anticipated in countries with well established 
earnings related pay-as-you-go schemes.  
The Australian second pillar, SGC, as documented by Bateman and Piggott (1997), began to play an 
increasingly role since the early 1980’s. Superannuation coverage reached more than 90 percent 
after the government act in 1991 requiring that all employers made superannuation contributions on 
behalf of their employees. In this new mandated Superannuation Guarantee system, private 
pensions are compulsory and occupational pensions are automatically vested, funded and 
preserved
9. As stressed in Bateman and Piggott (1997) over 90 per cent of employees are now 
covered by occupational superannuation. In addition, individuals can combine these mandated 
                                                 
7 The government Age Pension has been in place since 1909. Australia is virtually unique among OECD countries as its 
social security system is largely based on the social-assistance model (although with a growing private provision 
sector). The role of social assistance payments in Australia is quite different from the role they play in the other OECD 
countries; they are the normal form of  government income support rather than a residual complements to a social 
insurance system (Jackson and Bozic, 1997).  
8 The initial contribution rate was 3 per cent of earnings in 1986; the rate was 6 per cent in 1997-98 and 9 per cent in 
2002-2003. 
9 The term preservation mean that the individual could not withdraw assets until after age 55. However later legislation 
gradually shifted it to age 60. As emphasized by Gallagher, Rothman and Brown (1993) an indicative projection for 
someone receiving average earnings, contribute to superannuation for 40 years and retire at age 65 or over, gives an 
after-tax replacement rates of about 60 per cent.  
   9
occupational pensions with voluntary superannuation (third pillar) assisted by generous tax 
concessions.  
Following Disney and Johnson (2001) and Bateman and Piggott (1997) we can distinguish between 
five types of income sources for the Australian retired population: public transfer which is primarily 
composed by the Age Pension, private pensions, earnings, investment income and other income. 
After public transfers, the investment income represents on average the major source of income, 
followed by private pensions and earnings. As aging raises the incidence of earning of retired 
individuals declines. 
In an international comparative analysis, Australian pension system is usually considered having a 
reliance on social assistance model of government transfers. The reform developed by this country 
seems to drive to a reduction of social assistance model increasing the role of  social insurance.  
In conclusion the elements of Australian social insurance are essentially private, even if it is 
compulsory and regulated by the government.  
 
Icelandic Pension System 
The Icelandic pension system is based on three pillars and its dominant feature is the role of 
occupational pension funds. It is mandatory to pay at least 10 per cent of total wages and salaries to 
these funds. The first pillar, according to the accepted terminology in this field, is a tax-financed 
public pension. The occupational pension funds are the second pillar, mandatory as the Australian 
one. The third pillar is voluntary pension saving with tax incentives
10. A comprehensive pension 
reform took place in 1997 and 1998 that affected the second and third pillar.  
Iceland is not facing the problems of the most developed countries due to the aging population. First 
of all, Icelandic people are younger and, according to the predictions for 2030, its dependency ratio 
will remain lower than the other European countries (Bros et.al.,1994). Moreover, labour 
participation rates of the elderly are also higher and the effective retirement age is higher than the 
most industrialized nations. This happens because of the particular Icelandic social security system 
in which individuals are entitled to receive public pension only from the age of 67 and pension 
funds are regulated so that no incentives are given for early retirement.   
The public pension pillar provides an old age, disability and survivors pension. It is divided into a 
basic and supplementary pension, both are means-tested. As stressed in Gudmundsson (2004), the 
basic pension is about 15% of the average earnings of unskilled workers but with the supplementary 
pension the total pension can go up to 70% of the same earnings. The low substitution rate of basic 
pension is compensated by supplementary public pension and pension paid by pension funds. 
                                                 
10 Most of the following is based on Gudmundsson (2001, 2004) and Gudmundsson and Baldursdóttir (2005).   10
The second pillar is based on occupational pension funds. It is mandatory by law to pay at least 10 
per cent of all wages and salaries into fully funded pension plans that provide lifelong retirement 
and disability benefits
11. Many of the funds were established through a collective labour agreement 
in 1969. Most of them are managed jointly by representatives from the trade unions and employers. 
Only in 1998, comprehensive legislation covering the operation of pension funds came into force
12. 
Funds with employer guarantees and ordinary private funds show several differences concerning the 
amount of contributions and benefits and also regarding risk-bearing. The recent reforms of public 
sector pension funds imply that all new employees will become members of fully funded schemes 
with an accumulation of pension rights alike to that prevailing on the private market. 
At the beginning of 2005 there were forty-eight pension funds in Iceland. Ten of them were no 
longer receiving contributions. Other ten had employer guarantees from the government and 
municipalities. There were twenty-eight fully operational occupational pension funds that did not 
have an employer guarantee. 
In regard to benefits level of Icelandic pension funds, members of the private sector can begin to 
withdraw old age pensions at the age of 67, while in the old public sector scheme the limit is 65
13. 
Furthermore, there are several differences in pension benefits paid by different types of funds.  
Gudmundsson (2001), estimated on reasonable assumptions that, according to the established rules, 
a typical general occupational pension fund will pay to a person retiring at 69 a pension benefit 
amounting to 45-58% of the fulltime earnings of current employees and that the basic public 
pension might add another 11%, giving a total replacement ratio of 60-70%. 
In the 1980s and 1990s pension fund assets grew from 14% to 80% per annum in real terms of 
GDP. This placed Iceland fourth among EU and EFTA countries in terms of the size of second 
pillar pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP, after the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. 
The third pillar is characterized by voluntary private pension savings for which in 1998 a tax 
incentive legislation was adopted as part of the general pension reform. Employees are currently 
allowed to deduct from their taxable income a contribution to authorised individual pension 
schemes up to 4% of wages. The pension schemes have to be authorised by the Ministry of Finance. 
They are in most cases defined contribution individual accounts. The pension saving is not 
                                                 
11 Total contribution rate is 10 per cent of total salaries, 4 per cent paid by the employees and 6 per cent by the 
employers. The investment returns of pension funds are tax-free. Pension benefits are taxed in the same way as income 
from employment. 
12 The main elements in the law are the definition of 1) which entities are allowed to call themselves pension funds and 
receive mandatory contributions for pension rights, 2) minimum pension rights and forms of pension, 3) general 
requirements for operating pension funds regarding size, risk, internal auditing and funding, 4) guidelines and limits for 
the funds’ investment policies based on the risk diversification principle. 
13 It is possible, however, to start withdrawing pensions in the private sector as early as 65, but then with a reduced 
benefit, or as late as 70 with additional benefits. The benefit rule in the new public sector scheme and in the private 
sector is in general neutral towards the choice of early or late retirement.   11
redeemable until the age of 60 and has to be paid in equal payments over a period of at least seven 
years.  
In 2003 and 2004 the assets of Icelandic pension funds and life insurance was respectively 138.4 
and 146.2 as a percent of GDP (OECD, 2005). The reason is that contribution to pension funds 
exceed benefits paid from them because of pensioners are few in proportion to working fund 
members. Furthermore, most of them have contributed to the fund only for short period of their 
working life ad so they are entitled only to relatively small benefits. As a consequence, pension 
funds fed on their own investments. 
 
 
4. Data, methodology and empirical results 
 
The principal task in this paper is to search for a long-run equilibrium relationship and short-term 
dynamics between national savings and a set of  explanatory variables (here after, “Z”) like public 
pension provision, private pension funds and selected macroeconomic factors, that could affect 
savings patterns. In doing that we follow three steps. Firstly, we consider the  orthogonality 
problem that usually arises when we work with financial variables. To overcome this peculiar 
aspect we implement the SURE methodology. Secondly we move our analysis to the study of the 
long-run relationship between national saving and a vector of exogenous variables like private 
pension funds, public pension provision, life insurance funds and general macroeconomic variables. 
Finally we estimate, using a Kalman filter approach, a 'backward-looking' process for national savings 
with parameters varying with fundamental component of the private pension plans.  The time varying 
methodology allows us to recover an unobservable factor that could affect national savings. For each 
endogenous variables of the model it is therefore possible to observe how the respective coefficients 
have changed over time. 
 
4.1 Data analysis 
 
The choice of the sample 1988-2005 for Australia using quarterly observation and 1997-2005 for 
Iceland using monthly observation was essentially based on the need of analysing the behaviour of 
savings in both countries after substantial reforms of the pension systems took place. For the 
estimation of the equations used in this work, the variables considered are
14: 
                                                 
14 Data source: IMF - Financial Statistics, Reserve Bank of Australia, Iceland Central bank and OECD statistics.   12
•  SAV is the logarithm of national aggregate saving of Australia and Iceland  based on the 
current account definition of savings as the residual difference between total income and 
consumption; 
•  PAYG is defined as the logarithm of total expenditure on public pension benefits.   
Australian and Icelandic public pension systems are schemes for the payment of old age 
pension, disability pension and survivor’s pension established by a municipal corporation, 
local government or public authority. In particular, for Iceland, the old age pension is in 
most cases paid from the age of 67. The variables are from the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) and Central Bank of Iceland. In a pay as you go 
program young workers generation transfers a fraction of its wage to the current retirees. 
This program does not invest the contributions, accumulating capital, but simply destine 
them to retirees, leading to an intergenerational reallocation of resources. In the literature  
about this topic Feldstein (1974) was the pioneer. He based his analysis on an extended life-
cycle model in which there are also pension variables as key determinants and he argued 
that unfunded schemes affect saving decisions through two different channels: the asset 
substitution effect and the retirement effect
15. Some researchers doubt that individuals 
participating into pension program have bequest motive. Moreover the net effect depend on 
the interactions of the two effects considered. Feldstein’s time series investigation of the 
consumer expenditure equation based on aggregate annual U.S. data concludes that pay-as-
you-go systems led to lower savings, slowing accumulation down (even if the trade off 
seems to be less than one to one). Some cross-section studies confirmed these findings: 
Feldstein and Pellecchio (1979), and Diamond and Hausman (1984) take into account 
saving and retirement behaviour while Hubbard (1985) used the portfolio choice theory. The 
strongest theoretical challenge of Feldstein’s findings come from Barro (1978). He found in 
Feldstein’s estimation some omissions in the determinants of consumption function. Barro 
added to consumer-expenditure function additional variables such as the government 
surplus, the unemployment rate and the stock of durable goods. He found that the coefficient 
of social security wealth is not significantly different from zero. In another major 
contribution Darby (1979), argues that life-cycle saving provides only a partial explanation 
of individual saving behaviour. Moreover Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) questioned Feldstein’s 
results by pointing out their sensitivity  to the estimation of social security variables. Even if 
                                                 
15 The asset substitution effect depends on the presence of bequest motives and on the empirical rilavance of the 
Ricardian equivalence: a future tax burden deriving from a social security would be taken into account from rational 
individuals; as a consequence they would increase their saving to compensate future generations. The retirement effect 
implies that if the pension benefits rules induce early retirement, the private saving rise since earlier retirement means a 
shorter span of years of earnings.   13
the empirical evidence doesn’t show a clear trade-off between pension wealth and other 
household wealth, some economists support the view that a shift from an unfunded to a 
funded program would increase saving and capital accumulation (see Kotlikoff, 1998, for 
the U.S. case). Based on the above discussion, in this study we expect a negative 
relationship between saving and PAYG.   
•  PENS  is defined as the logarithm total expenditure on private pension funds.  The 
Superannuation  data is based on The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 
Quarterly Survey of Superannuation  and estimates of other industry components. The 
Survey, a joint APRA and Australian Bureau of Statistics  (ABS), currently collects 
information from the largest 340 superannuation funds in Australia. For Iceland PENS is 
mandatory by law to pay at least 10% of all wages and salaries into fully funded pension 
schemes that provide lifelong retirement and disability pensions. These are mostly provided 
by occupational pension funds. Many of these funds were set up through collective 
agreements between the partners on the labour market in 1969. Proponents of privatisation 
of social security system draw attention to the positive impact it would have on both public 
and private savings
16. An important motivation underlying the development of pension 
funds is the opinion that the accumulation of pension assets encourages aggregate savings. 
However this assertion is highly debated. Gale (1994), World Bank (1994) and Davis (1995) 
provide evidence about the evolution of the relationship between pension funds and saving. 
They found that countries with high levels of pension funding such as the US and the UK 
have comparatively low saving rates. The shift from an unfunded to a funded pension 
program would play a key role in stimulating the development of long-term investment 
instruments. However this idea doesn’t pay attention to the impact that uncertainty of future 
could have on individuals due to privatization. As emphasized by Michell and Zeldes (1996) 
the introduction of individual pension funds could have a double opposite impact: on a one 
hand it reduces the risk of social security benefit rules changes but, on another hand, it 
would rise uncertainty because of the reduction of earning insurance. Therefore the net 
effect of funded pension system on national saving is ambiguous. However since Australia 
and Iceland are increasingly meeting the criteria of the prototype three pillar system (as 
suggested by World Bank), we expect for those countries a positive sign of the private 
pension funds variables.  
                                                 
16 See the large literature on the privatization of social security, e.g. World Bank (1994), Feldstein (1998), Belan and 
Pestieau (1999)   14
•  INS is the logarithm of insurance providing payment of a sum of money to a beneficiary on 
the death of the insured person or if the insured person reaches a certain age (ABS 
definition), also known as life insurance. The Australian Government supports the third 
pillar of the retirement income system by providing tax concessions for voluntary saving 
both within and outside of superannuation. Around 27 per cent of employees already receive 
employer contributions greater than the Superannuation Guarantee level, while 20 per cent 
of all employees make voluntary post-tax contributions (Australian Bureau of Statistics and 
Treasury). For Iceland the third pillar, a fully funded voluntary savings plan, is still 
relatively small. However the recent reforms, including a special tax incentive to pay into a 
private savings scheme of up to 4 per cent of the total income, will serve to gradually 
increase their role in the overall pension system in the coming years. Schemes are typically 
taken out with a bank, or life-insurance company, and are usually pure savings products. 
The monthly statistics for assets of pension funds including life insurance are compiled from 
monthly reports from 23 pension funds published by Central Bank of Iceland.  
The analytical framework  usually used to study the impact of voluntary pension program on 
saving is the life cycle model as for the mandatory funded one. According to Besley and 
Meghir (1998), the public policies promoting voluntary saving are an alternative way to 
create tax favoured assets. Hence, based on the above consideration, we would expect a 
positive influence of life insurance on national saving.  
•  INT is the nominal interest rate. We use money market rate (average rate on money market) 
as a measure of interest for both countries. The impact of interest rates on household savings 
is ambiguous because income and substitution effects work in opposite directions.  
•  GRW is GDP rate of growth for Australia calculated using nominal GDP while for Iceland 
we use the industrial production (IP) as a proxy of nominal GDP. There are several 
suggestion from economic theories about the positive relationship between economic growth 
and aggregate saving. Many empirical studies have noted a very high degree of correlation 
between growth rates and saving rates; however, direction of causation is not clear. 
Economic development theories generally assume that the causality runs from saving to 
growth, through the formation of human and physical capital. Conversely many 
consumption theories have assumed that the causality runs from growth to saving 
(Modigliani, 1970 and  1993). The life cycle hypothesis implies that there is positive 
relation between income and saving. This is due to people that are forward looking and base 
their savings decisions on lifetime income. Therefore, we would expect a positive 
relationship between economic growth and national saving .   15
•  Finally, the variable DR is the dependency ratio. It is calculated as the ratio of people over 
64 to people aged 20-64 years. According to the life-cycle model, the higher the ratio of the 
elderly population to the working-age population, that is DR, the lower could be the 
aggregate saving because the old are retired and do not save while the young work and do 
save. Hence we expect a negative relationship between dependency ratio and national 
saving. 
Our use of pension variables (PENS, PAYG and INS) transformed in logarithms rather than in 
level reflects the general interest in the social security literature in relative versus absolute effect 
of this variables on national saving. 
 
 
  4.2 Methodology and empirical results 
 
4.2.1 The Sure analysis 
One of the central conditions to achieve identification when we deal with financial variables is that 
the structural form shocks are orthogonal to one another. That is, we assume that the error term is 
orthogonal to the variables on the right side of the equation (1) below. In reality, this condition may 
not be satisfied, in particular if asset price shocks are driven by common shocks, as indicated by 
past experiences. Common shocks for asset prices within a country may be news about economic 
fundamentals in the respective country, such as changes in the conduct of the monetary policy or 
announcements of releases of relevant macroeconomic data. Moreover, there may be common 
shocks for international asset prices, such as oil price shocks. 
Following the approach commonly used in the related literature we address the issue that the three 
series  it PENS ,  it PAYG , and  it INS  are nearly orthogonal or uncorrelated. The correlation between 
them measure the extent to which each series provide “orthogonal information”. The former 
problem is related to the possibility that financial variables are simultaneously determined. This can 
occur either because they cause each other or because they have some common omitted 
determinants. For instance, we assume that pension funds assets are nearly orthogonal to the life 
insurance assets. One reason for a violation of this condition would be a contemporaneous response 
of interest rates to pension and life insurance funds.  
Generally speaking, ignoring this potential correlation might reduce the efficiency of the estimates, 
or even produce biased estimates if these variables are correlated with other included explanatory 
variables. To examine the impact of controlling for this correlation, we estimate a  Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) system of four equations: one for private pension   16
(PENS), one for the public pension (PAYG), another for the additional private pension (INS)  and 
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The above set of equations has contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation so that, the 
equations seem unrelated which states that the idiosyncratic shocks of the three markets are 
independent.  This method, also known as the multivariate regression, or Zellner's method, 
estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous 
correlation in the errors across equations. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are 
based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. In equation (1) we use impulses in a 
separate system so we can investigate the relationship among  the impulses (PENS, PAYG, INS and 
i). The estimated results are presented in  table 1a and table 1b in appendix.  
 
[Table 1a and 1b about here] 
 
The residuals from this system of equations are then the new financial market variables 
(
it pens μ =RPENS, 
it payg μ =RPAYG, 
it ins μ = RINS and 
it i μ =Ri, henceforth).   Figures 1 and 2 
(Appendix) describe the residuals of the estimations of eq. (1) for the two countries.   
 
[Figures 1 and 2  about here] 
 
 
It is worth mentioning the shaded area in figure 2 that shows a steady  jump of all the variables due 
to a shock in the economy. In fact, starting from 1998,  signals of overheating of the Icelandic 
economy became increasingly visible. Inflation took off and reached 6% in the spring of 2000. 
These imbalances were the underlying cause for a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency in 
the latter half of 2000 and in 2001, with inflation rising to above 9% in January 2002. The economy   17
then underwent rapid adjustment, the current account deficit disappeared in the space of two years 




4.2.2 The Cointegration analysis 
 
The second step of the empirical analysis is related to the concept of cointegration. It is developed 
from the belief that certain economic variables should not diverge from each other by too far a 
distance or diverge without bound. Such variables may drift apart in the short-run but if they 
continue to be too far apart in the long-run, then economic forces will bring them together again 
(Granger, 1986). As such, an error correction model can be established to capture the short-run 
equilibrium. Hence, cointegration techniques seem to be ideally matched with the many economic 
theories that are contained in long-run equilibrium terms (McKenzie, 1997). 
In light of this, the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration (Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith, 2001) will be used as it has good small sample properties in comparison with these 
techniques, as well as circumventing the problem of the order of integration of the individual 
variables.  
The main advantage of the ARDL approach is that it can be applied regardless of whether the 
regressors are I(0)  or  I(1), and this avoids pre-testing problems associated with the standard 
cointegration analysis such as Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) which requires the 
classification of the variables into I(1) and I(0). The statistical procedures are covered in two stages 
and are briefly explained below. 
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where n is the sample size, SAVt is the log of national savings and Zt is a vector of exogenous 
variables described in section 4.1.  
At a first glance, a preliminary graphical analysis of variables in figures 1 and 2 show the presence 
of several jumps of the variables. Therefore it may be of interest to test the stability of regression 
coefficients in eq.(2) because a change in parameters between two periods can be seen as an 
indicator of structural changes. We run a basic regression of eq. (2) in order to investigate the 
                                                 
17 Source:  Economy of Iceland, The Central Bank of Iceland, monthly  publication,  November 2005.   18
stability of the coefficients and, consequently, to set also the right number of dummies.  We use the 
recursive residual test to identify a likely break in eq. (2) and then test for its statistical significance 
using a Chow test. In figures 3 and 4, in appendix, the plots of the recursive residuals about the zero 
line ± two standard errors are shown at each point.  Since residuals outside the standard error bands 
suggest instability in the parameters of the equation, we need to construct several binary variables 
for each single country.  
 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Moreover,  we also checked the Chow test for structural breakpoints in the sample of eq. (2). Table 
2  shows the results of this test. 
Finally, based on the results obtained from the above two tests, the following dummies were 
generated
18: in 1997:01_02 (dummy1) and 2000:02_03 (dummy2) for Australia and 1999:01 
(dummy3), 2000:02 (dummy4), 2001:01(dummy5), 2003:01(dummy6) and 2005:01(dummy7) for 
Iceland.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
4.2.3 Testing for cointegration 
 
For investigating the presence of a long-run relationship between the variables we will use two 
separate statistics. The first involves an F-test on the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the level variables are jointly equal to zero (see Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999, and Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith, 2001). The second is a t-test on the lagged level dependent variable. The statistics have a 
non-standard distribution and depend on whether the variables are individually I(0) or I(1). 
In this first stage, a "bound test" is conducted to search for the existence of a long-run relation 
between the variables in the system. Basically, the lagged level terms are added to an error 
correction form of the underlying ARDL model and the F-statistic is computed
19. Instead of the 
conventional critical values, this test involves two asymptotic critical value bounds, depending on 
whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) or a mixture of both.  
                                                 
18 These dummies are defined as one in the specified period and zero elsewhere. 
19 Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) tabulate two sets of asymptotic critical values to provide critical value bounds for all 
classifications of the regressors into pure I(1), purely I(0) or mutually cointegrated.   19
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) provide critical values for this bounds test from an extensive set of 
stochastic simulations under differing assumptions regarding the appropriate inclusion of 
deterministic variables in the error-correction model (ECM). If the calculated test statistic (which is 
a standard F test for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lagged levels terms are 
jointly equal to zero) lies above the upper bound, the result is conclusive and implies that a long-run 
relationship does exist between the variables. If the test statistic lies within the bounds, no 
conclusion can be drawn without knowledge of the time series properties of the variables. In this 
case, standard methods of testing would have to be applied. If the test statistic lies below the lower 
bound, no long-run relationship exists. 
In the present context, the investigations involve testing the existence of a long-run relation between 
national savings, private pension funds, public pension provision, life insurance funds and general 
macroeconomic variables.  
The model in eq. (2) is more appropriately regarded as representing the equilibrium relationship in 
the long-run, but is unlikely to hold exactly in every single period. Hence a dynamic specification is 
required in order to allow the model to capture the short-run adjustment process without losing 
important information about the long-run equilibrium behaviour of the variables.  
This study uses an ECM with unrestricted intercept and restricted trends
20. 
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where α0 is the drift component, T  is the deterministic trend, ΔSAVt is the variation of national 
savings, Zt is a vector of pension variables (private pension funds, pay-as-you-go, life insurance 
funds),  ecmt-1 is the equilibrium correction term (μt) given in equation (2), Dj  are dummies 
(dummy1 to dummy7) as described in section 4.2.2, with γ’s as the long-run multipliers, β's as 
short-run dynamic coefficients, (p) as the order of the underlying ARDL-model (p),   and  εt are 
white noise errors.  This dynamic model shows that the movement of the variables in any period is 
related to the previous period’s gap from long-run equilibrium. In other words, from eq. (3) 
whenever ΔSAVt turns out to differ from Zt-1, some sort of adjustment must occur to restore the 
equilibrium in the subsequent period. 
                                                 
20  Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001, p. 296.    20
Following Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) we try to determine the proper lag length p in eq (3) with 
and without a deterministic linear trend. Table 3, in appendix, presents these results using the 
Akaike’s and Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and SBC). For Australia both cases 
(with and without trend) suggest the use of one lag (k=1). For Iceland, the results suggest the use of 
two lags (k=2) for the AIC and one lag (k=1)for the SBC. According to Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999) the SBC is preferable to AIC as it selects the smallest possible lag length. Hence, for the 
sake of parsimony, we use the SBC as the lag selection criterion with  p=1 for both countries. 
  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Based on the previous discussion, we test for the absence of a long-run relationship between the 
national savings and the pension funds variables employing an F-test for the joint null hypothesis 
0 , 2 , 1 = = i i γ γ , under the alternative hypotheses that there is a stable long-run level relationship 
between the aforementioned variables.  
The bounds test results for the complete sample period are presented in Table 4 where equation (3) is 
estimated and then the F- statistics are computed. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Using the asymptotic critical value bounds computed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), the F-statistic 
lies above the 0.10 upper bound. Hence the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected. 
 
At this stage of the ARDL cointegration method, it is also possible to perform a parameter stability 
test for the appropriately selected ARDL representation of the model. 
The stability of coefficients of regression equations are, by and large, tested by means of Hansen 
(1992), and Hansen and Johansen (1993). The Chow stability test requires a priori knowledge of 
structural breaks in the estimation period and its shortcomings are well documented. 
In Hansen (1992) and Hansen and Johansen (1993) procedures, stability tests require I(1) variables 
and they check the long-run parameter constancy without incorporating the short-run dynamics of a 
model into the testing – as discussed in Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002). However, it 
is possible to overcome these shortcomings by employing the Brown et al. (1975) procedure if we 
follow Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). The Brown et al. stability testing technique, also known as 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests, is based on the 
recursive regression residuals. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are updated recursively and   21
plotted against the break points of the model. Providing that the plot of these statistics fall inside the 
critical bounds of 5% significance then we assume that the coefficients of a given regression are 
stable. These tests are usually implemented by means of graphical representation. It can be seen 
from figures 5 and 6, the plots of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are within the critical bounds 
implying that all coefficients in the model are stable. 
 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
 
 
Once the bounds tests have confirmed the existence of a long-run relationship between savings and 
pension funds, for Australia and Iceland, we use the Granger causality test in order to clarify the 
direction of causation among the variables. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that ΔSAV do not Granger cause RPENS, RPAYG 
and RINS but we do reject the hypothesis that RPENS, RPAYG and RINS does not Granger cause 
ΔSAV. Therefore it appears that Granger causality runs one-way from RPENS, RPAYG and RINS to 
ΔSAV and not the other way.  
Based on the previous discussion we continue with the ARDL procedure. Eq. (3) can be interpreted as 
an ARDL model which provide inference for the short run dynamics. A maximum lag order of one 
was allowed in the ARDL model and we used the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria to select optimal lag 
orders. In this case, an ARDL(p=1) model was selected for Iceland and for Australia. The estimated 
long-run relationship was of the form presented in eq. (3). Tables 6 and 7 present the empirical 
results obtained from estimating equation (3) for the period 1988Q1 – 2005Q4 for Australia and 
1997M1-2005M12 for Iceland.  Both regressions fit reasonably well and pass the main diagnostic 
tests. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the ARDL method for  Australia. The constant term is positive but not 
significant while the coefficient of the trend variable is significant at 0.01 level. The coefficient of 
Australian pension plans (RPENS) is positive and highly significant with a lag of one quarter. We 
know, in general, that the effects of pensions funds on saving are composite due to the combination of 
the concentration phenomenon and the existence of tax incentives.     22
However, despite the common view asserting that on average if people pay less taxes and get less 
benefits when they are old, hence, it encourages saving, the pension system in Australia ensure quite 
high benefits and saving is not discouraged. As we stressed earlier, a single economic cause might 
effect two or more of our measured factors. However there is in the literature an  heterodox argument 
proposed by Coates (2004, p.83) that tried to explain why in Australia “…compulsory 
superannuation has not increased national savings and is unlikely to do so into the future…”. These 
claims are based on the link between national saving and the globalisation effects. He argues that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the national savings components due to the inflow and 
outflow of capitals. Our approach is, however, more “traditional” and based on the assumption that, 
for Australia and Iceland, these international effects, small in size and magnitude, could not offset 
the impact of social security reforms on changes in national saving. 
It is also significant the coefficient of the RPAYG at 0.01 level with a negative sign. This result is in 
line with the current theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that an increase in the size of pay-
as-you-go system tends to decrease national saving.  
According to our results, national saving is positively related to the variable RINS and statistically 
highly significant. The coefficient of DR is not statistically significant and with the wrong sign while 
GRW is positive as expected and significant.  The two dummies used for the Australia, dummy1 and 
dummy2, are statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
Finally, the coefficient of the ecm represents the speed of adjustment to restore equilibrium in the 
dynamic model following a disturbance. It is -0.32, this implies that a deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium following a short run shock is corrected by about 32 per cent after one quarter. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the ARDL method for Iceland. All levels estimates are highly significant 
and have also the expected signs. The results suggest that there is a strong evidence between what the 
theory predict (about the relationship between savings and pension funds) and the estimated variables.  
The constant term is positive and highly significant at 0.01 level as well as the coefficient of the trend 
variable. The estimated retirement savings variables (RPENS, RPAYG and RINS) show the   
coefficients with correct signs and statistically significant at 0.01. Both DR and GRW are with the right 
signs but the former is not statistically significant at 0.05 level. The results of eq.(3) for the short run 
estimations  show the complex dynamics that seem to exist between changes in saving and changes in 
the pension funds. Among them, ΔRPENS is the only one statistically significant at 0.05 level.   23
The ecm coefficient is statistically significant at 0.01 per cent and is -0.34, this implies that a deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium following a short run shock is corrected by about 34 per cent after one 
month. 
Finally, table 7 shows the results of the five dummies (dummy3-7) used for Iceland. All of them are 
statistically significant at 0.01 level and coefficients’ value varying between 0.17 (dummy5) and 
0.78 (dummy6). 
Overall, our results for Australia and Iceland are consistent with the ones by Granville and Mallick 
(2004) that found evidence suggesting that increases in mandatory pension funds financial assets 
increase national saving. 
As regards the relation between dependency ratio and changes in national saving, it should be noted 
that population ageing will itself generate changes in saving which may have a major 
macroeconomic impact. According to the life cycle theory, savings rates tend to decline in countries 
where there are larger number of retired people (Disney, 2000). The changes in savings lead to 
changes in demand for financial assets. Econometrics studies find a strong effect of aging 
population on private saving as in Masson et al (1998) who finds the total dependency ratio to have 
a significant negative effect on private saving in a panel of both advanced and developing countries. 
 
 
4.2.4 The Kalman filter 
 
In this final section we estimate, using a Kalman filter approach, a 'backward-looking' process for 
national savings with parameters varying with fundamental component of the private pension plans. 
Harvey, (1989) discussing about the state space form, argues that "the key to handling structural time 
series models is the state space form, with the state of the system representing the various unobserved 
components such as trends and seasonal. Once in the state space form (SSF), the Kalman filter 
provides the means of updating the state as new observations become available"
21. The Kalman filter is 
then, a recursive procedure of computing the optimal estimator of the state vector at time t, based on 
the information available at time t. One of the reasons for the central role of the Kalman filter is that 
"[...] when the disturbances and the initial state vector are normally distributed, it enables the likelihood 
function to be calculated via what is known as the prediction error decomposition. This opens the way 
for estimation of any unknown parameters in the model"
22. The time varying methodology allows us to 
recover an unobservable factor that could affect national savings. For each endogenous variables of the 
model it is therefore possible to observe how the respective coefficients have changed over time. 
                                                 
21 Harvey (1989, p. 10). 
22 Harvey (1989, p. 10).   24
Assuming that saving, ΔSAVt, is driven by a AR(n) process, we apply the following time varying 
parameters model: 
 
it n t it n t it n t it it it RINS RPAYG RPENS SAV μ β β β β + + + + = Δ − − − , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0                (5)     
 
where i is the country, μit is an independent white noise, the coefficients are assumed to be random 
walks. This can be written in state space form where the observation equation is given by (5) above 
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Where eq. (6) is the measurement equation with St and εt are [nx1] vectors
23.  The relevant results 
and estimates are reported in figure 5 and 6 and table 4 for Australia and Iceland respectively. 
The pattern of the coefficients βt seems to capture well the economic dynamic of the period. The 
most important result is that the model “works” as shown in figures 7 and 8 in which the behaviour 
of the pension funds for the two countries vary over time. In particular, the coefficients  1 β  
(RPENS) in figure 7 and 8 illustrate a shift downward soon after the launch of the reforms in 1993 
and in 1998 in Australia and Iceland respectively. Both coefficients show a stable positive trend 
after these shifts. However the magnitude is different from the two countries. In facts, the average 
value of the coefficient  1 β  for Australia fluctuated around the value of 0.8, while the same 
coefficient for Iceland fluctuates around the value of 0.6 for all the sample. 
 
[Table 8  about here] 
 
The coefficients  2 β  (RPAYG) for Australia and Iceland show two different trends for all the 
periods. Soon after the reform, the trends fluctuate till the end of 1998 for Australia and 2000 for 
Iceland when the path of the coefficients show a slight negative trend that lasts till the end of the 
period.  
                                                 
23 For a more complete explanation of the Kalman filter approach, the state space form and the measurement and 
transition equations, see Harvey (1989). 
   25
Finally the coefficients  3 β  (RINS) show a similar path for both countries after the implementation 
of the reforms. The coefficients rise sharply reaching the peak in 1996 for Australia and 2000 for 
Iceland. The latter slightly converge towards the value of 0.05 while for Australia, the path of 
coefficient  3 β  reverses towards the value 1.09 until the beginning of 2003 when it shows an 
explosive course. A possible explanation of this sharply rise in the value of the coefficient of life-
insurance could  be related to tax concessions for voluntary saving both within and outside of 
superannuation provided by Australian Government. 
 
5  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
According to Munnell (1982) a perfect world should be characterized by perfect capital and labour 
markets, no uncertainty, no taxes and, in this framework, pension saving should be a perfect 
substitute for other kinds of saving. Unfortunately we live in a not perfect world in which there are 
imperfect markets, taxation, uncertainties and several different opportunities for savings. Because of 
that, the complete substitution of pension saving for other forms of savings may not occur. Hence, 
should be reasonable to expect that countries which have funded occupational pension scheme 
would have higher national savings rate than countries which do not. 
In this work we have tried to examine the pension systems of Australia and Iceland in a more 
general perspective with the purpose to analyse how their retirement income provisions have 
evolved into a multi-pillar arrangement and their impact on national saving. Moreover, we would 
like to ask – without completely answering the question – if there are important lessons for others in 
Australia’s and Iceland’s pension experiences. Noticeably, general principles will always have to be 
applied with a great degree of attention to the specific situation in each country. 
Australian and Icelandic occupational fully funded pension plans have become just as important as 
the public pay-as-you-go system, while the latter is the dominant pillar in many other OECD 
countries. It is also worth noting the differences in aging population structure and in social security 
history of these two countries as describe in section three. 
The novelty aspects of our results can be summarized as follow.  
Firstly, in this work a combinations of different econometric methodologies have been 
implemented. The innovative use of these methodologies allowed us to overcome the critics about 
the ambiguous impact of social security variables on national saving and to get time varying 
coefficients in order to show the reaction of national saving to the implementation of private second 
pension pillar. We started considering the orthogonality problem that usually arise when we work 
with financial variables. To overcome this peculiar aspect we applied the SURE methodology. Then   26
we moved to the study of the long-run relationship between changes in national saving and a vector 
of exogenous variables using the ARDL model. Finally we estimated a 'backward-looking' process 
for national savings with parameters varying with fundamental component of the private pension plans.  
For each endogenous variables of the model we observed how the respective coefficients changed over 
time. 
Secondly, in this paper we have found substantial evidence that a mandatory pension fund has a 
positive impact on national saving in Australia and Iceland. In particular, our finding showed that 
the coefficient of pension plans was positive and significant for both countries. The coefficients of the 
PAYG and INS were also significant with the right sign as predicted by the theory. These findings are 
consistent with the current empirical literature.  Moreover, using the Kalman filter methodology we 
were able to show that, the pattern of the coefficients of private pension, pay-as-you-go and life 
insurance, capture the economic dynamic of the period for both countries. The coefficient of private 
pension shift upward soon after the launch of the reforms in 1993 and in 1998 in Australia and 
Iceland respectively, illustrating a stable trend after the reforms.  
Neverthless, the following two elements can be considered as the main policy implications for 
others. 
As discussed in section one, the results exhibit that the social security reform that take the form of 
three-pillar system is, in particular, beneficial for small open economies. In fact, in small open 
economy, the effects on financial market development are much clearer due to the contribute of 
inflow of capital on pension funds. This effect can be different in magnitude depending on the 
degree of openness and the financial integration of the economy. For instance, in Iceland the 
percentage of foreign assets of pension funds moved from 2 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2002. 
As it is confirmed by our empirical analysis, the change of magnitude of these assets have a 
significant effect on national saving. 
Finally, our empirical findings show that despite the aging structure (higher DR for Iceland 
compared to Australia) and the different degree of smoothness (a sweeping switch in Iceland and a 
steady one in Australia), the implementation of multipillar system in both cases leads to a general 
raise in national saving. Hence, a mandatory retirement saving policy could improve the financial 
sustainability of social security systems and, through the positive impact on national saving, can be 
seen as an additional engine of economic growth. 
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Table 1a   SURE estimation for  Australia 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression System eq.   ( 1)    
 
  Coefficient S.E.
α1     -3.693699**  0.664562
β1     0.809310**  0.086510
β2     0.012076**  0.000751
β3     0.061729**  0.007416
α2     6.002183**  0.193286
β4     0.607427**  0.064930
β5     -0.003006*  0.001171
β6     -0.037889**  0.006929
α3     13.08325  51.60368
β7     -20.29771*  7.905524
β8     61.19911**  3.807095
β9     -4.055701**  0.511624
α4     46.78784**  11.22775
β10     -9.551618**  1.746804
β11     11.67965**  1.403144
β12     -0.151420**  0.019102
Determinant residual covariance  5.76E-13
  
Sample  1991:1 2005:4     obs. 60 
 
Equation        PENS  = α1 + β1  PAYG  + β2  INS  +  β3  i    
R
2         0.98214 Adj.  R
2         0.98118  
 
Equation        PAYG = α2  + β4  PENS   +  β5  INS   +  β6  i   
R
2         0.95782 Adj.  R
2         0.95556  
      
Equation        INS = α3   + β7  PAYG  + β8  PENS   +  β9  i   
R
2         0.97802 Adj.  R
2         0.97684  
           
Equation         i = α4   + β10  PAYG    + β11  PENS     + β12  INS  
R
2         0.68184 Adj.  R
2         0.66480  
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Table 1b   SURE estimation for  Iceland 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression System eq.   ( 1)    
 
 Coefficient  S.E.
α1     -1.414746**  0.242941
β1     3.423704**  0.063008
β2     -0.231816**  0.030897
β3     -0.021931**  0.002163
α2     0.537971**  0.062810
β4     0.283981**  0.005226
β5     0.050422**  0.009598
β6     0.005573**  0.000666
α3     3.643490**  0.709020
β7     3.797691**  0.722926
β8     -1.448231**  0.193022
β9     -0.048202**  0.005962
α4     1.705755  11.60258
β10     80.03543**  9.568856
β11     -26.12565**  2.576827
β12     -9.191289**  1.136809
Determinant residual covariance  2.67E-12
  
Sample  1997:02 2005:12    obs. 107 
 
Equation        PENS  = α1 + β1  PAYG  + β2  INS  +  β3  i    
R
2         0.955416 Adj.  R
2         0.95412  
 
Equation        PAYG = α2  + β4  PENS   +  β5  INS   +  β6  i   
R
2         0.95161 Adj.  R
2         0.95019  
        
Equation        INS = α3   + β7  PAYG  + β8  PENS   +  β9  i   
R
2         0.93862 Adj.  R
2         0.93684  
      
Equation         i = α4   + β10  PAYG    + β11  PENS     + β12  INS   
R
2         0.70649 Adj.  R
2         0.66833  
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Table 2 Stability test results 
Chow tests results
* of eq. (2):   
SAVt =α0 +α1 RPENSt-1+ α2 RPAYGt-1+ α3 RINSt-1 + α4 GRWt + α5 SAVt-1  +εt     
Country         date        
 
Australia     1997:01_02        2.2667        
         (0.043)    
                 2000:02_03      0.7073     
       (0.665)    
Iceland       1999:01        2.3784      
       (0.034)    
       2000:02       6.6831      
          (0.000)  
   2001:01        18.436     
          (0.000)  
       2003:01        11.758        
          (0.000)  
                 2005:01        10.547 
         (0.000)      
* F-statistics with levels of significance in parentheses.   
 
Table 3  Lag-length selection criteria 
  With deterministic trend  Without deterministic trend 
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Notes: the lag order is selected on the basis of AIC and SBC and 
♦ indicates the lag 
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Table 4  Bounds tests 
 
Australian Bound test 
Unrestricted intercept and no trend  Unrestricted intercept and restricted trend 
  
F-stat 




Upper critical  
value 
K=1  F(4, 61)= 5.342550**  4.78  F(5, 60)= 7.631901**  4.49 
K=2  F(8, 58)= 0.936505
 ●  4.14  F(9, 57)= 1.419301
●   4.02 
 
Iceland Bound test  
Unrestricted intercept and no trend  Unrestricted intercept and restricted trend 
  F-stat  Upper critical  
value 
F-stat  Upper critical  
value 
K=1  F(4, 94)= 4.835065**  4.78  F(5, 93)= 5.759530**  4.49 
K=2  F(8, 91)= 4.099868*  4.14  F(9, 90)= 4.37177**  4.02 
Notes: the F-statistic is used to test for the joint significance of the coefficients of the lagged levels in the ARDL-
ECM. Asymptotic critical values are obtained from Table CI(iii) Case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend for 
k=1 and K=2 and from Table CI(iv) Case IV: unrestricted intercept and restricted trend for k=1 and K=2  (Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith, 2001, pp. 300-301). 
** indicates that the statistic lies above the 0.10 upper bound; * that it falls within the 0.10 bounds; 
● that it lies 





Table 5 Granger Causality Tests 
Australia    
   F-Statistic                       P-value 
 RINS versus ΔSAV   2.99347   0.03765 
 ΔSAV versus RINS  0.68961   0.56188 
 RRPAYG versus ΔSAV 2.61068    0.05944 
 ΔSAV versus  RPAYG   0.76391   0.51868 
 RPENS versus ΔSAV 4.11269    0.02088 
 ΔSAV versus  RPENS   1.86363   0.14502 
      
Iceland  
   F-Statistic                       P-value 
 RINS versus ΔSAV    3.10641   0.03005 
 ΔSAV versus RINS   0.64008   0.59104 
 RRPAYG versus ΔSAV   3.21589   0.02621 
 ΔSAV versus  RPAYG    0.41281   0.74417 
 RPENS versus ΔSAV   1.46586   0.22865 
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Table 6 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1)  eq. (3) Australia         
Dependent Variable: ΔSAV    
Regressor Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
C 0.523280  0.194061 
T 0.017516**  5.370430 
SAV(-1) 0.927414**  5.058258 
RPAYG(-1) -1.163849**  -3.133034 
RINS(-1) 0.830819**  3.128491 
RSUP(-1) 1.011497**  3.127485 
ΔSAV (-1)  0.123631*  2.466668 
ΔRINS(-1) -0.001491**  -6.063628 
ΔRPENS(-1) 0.006683**  6.083887 
ΔRPAYG(-1) -0.068746  -0.186233 
DR 0.060350  1.206272 
GRW 0.014838*  2.080539 
Ecm(-1) -0.327354**  -4.24798 
dummy1 0.152237**  4.120848 
dummy2 0.015951*  2.403695 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.621321   
S.E. of regression  0.040804   
Akaike info criterion  -3.331126   
Schwarz criterion  -2.762727   
F-statistic 3.766682   
Durbin-Watson stat    1.991353   
] 1628 . 0 [ 125 . 5 ) 3 (
2 = SC χ ;  ] 5361 . 0 [ 383 . 0 ) 1 (
2 = FF χ ; 
] 1081 . 0 [ 448 . 4 ) 2 (
2 = N χ ;                                         ] 6909 . 0 [ 724 . 0 ) 1 (
2 = H χ . 
♦significant at the 0.10 level; *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 
0.01 level ; Obs. 68 ( quarterly) 
 
 
Table 7 ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1)   eq. (3) Iceland 
Dependent Variable: ΔSAV    
Regressor Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
C 0.335384**  7.240215 
T 0.000616**  6.20697 
RPENS(-1) 0.666782**  4.0444 
RPAYG(-1) -1.72283**  -3.29602 
RINS(-1) 0.076993**  6.484825 
SAV(-1) -0.05598**  -6.88454 
ΔSAV(-1) 0.050783*  2.476001 
ΔRINS(-1) -0.02869  -1.23745 
ΔRPENS(-1) 0.06073*  2.31487 
ΔRPAYG(-1) -0.20084  -0.22336 
ecm(-1) -0.34589**  -48.2329 
DR -0.57807  -1.74515 
GRW 0.015289*  2.044793 
dummy3 0.50974*  2.102934 
dummy4 0.591361**  3.714033 
dummy5 0.176028**  6.19959 
dummy6 0.787526**  3.393111 
dummy7 0.63115**  4.366298 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.966709   
S.E. of regression  0.002681   
Durbin-Watson stat  1.977315   
Akaike info criterion  -8.90382   
Schwarz criterion  -8.62074   
 F-statistic  294.2874   
] 3966 . 0 [ 797 . 0 ) 3 (
2 = SC χ                                       ] 2356 . 0 [ 890 . 2 ) 1 (
2 = FF χ  
] 4126 . 0 [ 439 . 2 ) 2 (
2 = N χ                                      ] 8052 . 0 [ 6907 . 0 ) 1 (
2 = H χ  
♦significant at the 0.10 level; *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 
0.01 level ;  Obs. 106 (monthly).   35
 
Table 8 The Kalman estimations 
(Australia)   
it , 1 β   it , 2 β   it , 3 β  
2

















(Iceland)   
it , 1 β   it , 2 β   it , 3 β  
2




Obs. 105 (M) 
 0.734** 











*significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 0.01 level ; z-statistics in 
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